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Punitive Behavior in eBay 
Auctions 
Kyle Gibson, M.A. 
Abstract: EBay employs a system known as "feedback" to assure trust 
between those buying and selling items using its service. Feedback 
information on past auctions is available for all to see; a positive 
reputation is likely to increase a seller's business just as a negative 
reputation can harm it. The importance of a good eBay reputation 
(i.e., highfeedback score) may lead members of the eBay community to 
react harshly if they receive neutral or negative feedback. Here, the 
hypothesis that negative feedback is reciprocated/punished with 
negative feedback is supported The feedback system eBay uses does 
not serve the best interests of eBay members - it is simply not the most 
honest system possible. A more honest system would incorporate blind 
feedback in order to sidestep the inclination of some members to punish 
on principle alone. 
Introduction and Background 
Certain areas of the human psyche have been forged by 
natural selection to recognize, remember, and repay treatment judged as 
"unfair" (Axlerod 1984; Boyd 1992; Ostrom 2000; Hamilton 1963; 
Ridley 1996). Philosophers from Plato to Hobbes and Marx have 
contemplated this fact and, with it, the cultural institutions humans 
create to regulate and arbitrate "unfair" social transactions. EBay uses 
one such regulatory system in order to ensure honest, fair, and legal 
business practices are employed by its members; this system is known 
as "feedback." 
The feedback system works as follows (Modell): after an 
auction ends, buyers and sellers leave feedback for each other based on 
their shared auction experience. These ratings can be positive, neutral, 
or negative. The majority of eBay auctions transpire without any real 
problems and both the buyer and seller earn posjtive feedback from one 
another. However, sometimes an item or payment takes too long to 
arrive, does not arrive at all, or the auction is perceived negatively for 
some other reason. Negative feedback is reserved for these instances. 
Neutral feedback is meant to cover the remaining transactions but is, in 
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practice, quite rare. Of the 60 auctions reviewed for this paper, none 
involved neutral feedback. 
The feedback system is public and therefore gives buyers and 
sellers a concept of whom they might be doing business with before 
they are forced to enter into a transaction. Feedback can be left by 
either party at any time following an auction. The discrepancy in the 
time at which feedback is left seems to playa role in determining what 
feedback score is reciprocated (negative, neutral, or positive). This 
interaction between feedback position and score is of primary interest 
here. 
Modell: The eBay Feedback System 
EBay feedback transpires much like an ultimatum game. A 
single-sided ultimatum game works as follows. One person is given an 
easily divided item, often cash, and told they must divide it between 
themselves and an unknown "receiver." The receiver sees this offer 
and can either accept or reject it. If the offer is accepted, both players 
keep the money, if it is rejected; neither of them keeps any money 
(Fehr 2003; Henrich 2000; Ridley 1996). 
Classical, rational, economic theory dictates that "givers" 
should always give the smallest amount of money possible and 
receivers should accept any offer, no matter how small, because they 
both leave the game with more than they began with. The game, 
however, rarely follows this "rational" path. In "real world" 
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experiments, givers are more apt to offer around half of their money to 
receivers, who are likely to accept offers within this 50% range (Fehr 
2003). If, on the other hand, the offer falls below 20%, the receiver 
rejects it so both participants walk away empty-handed (Fehr 2003). 
The ultimatum game demonstrates that people would rather punish 
someone trying to take more than their "share" than to have any of it 
themselves. 
Here, I will test the hypothesis that receiving negative 
feedback first makes auction participants more likely to leave negative 
feedback for the person who left it for them, regardless of what 
transpired during the actual auction. 
The theoretical literature on game theory, altruism, and 
punitive behavior is voluminous. Rather than attempt to cover it all, 
this section will focus only on several recent articles that deal directly 
with the phenomenon of social punishment. Background on specific 
game-theoretical models can be found in numerous other works (see 
Ridley 1996 for an excellent overview). 
As a company and a community, eBay is highly dependent on 
the reliability, accuracy, and honesty of the feedback system. EBay 
encourages repeat buying and selling - some people even make their 
living auctioning goods on eBay. The high likelihood of repeat 
interaction and the use of public reputations (feedback) regulates eBay 
interactions. Buyers and sellers must conduct business "by the book" if 
they wish to maintain an honorable reputation and remain a member of 
the community. Ernst Fehr and Fischbacher (2003) detail the 
importance of such a reputation in social interaction. They show that 
the prospect of gaining a reputation increases the likelihood of 
cooperative behavior among individuals by more than 35%. The 
number is even higher if the actors believe they will interact with each 
other again in the future (Engelmann 2002 in Fehr & Fischbacher 
2003). For people who use eBay repeatedly, a good reputation can 
mean the difference between getting a sale or a deal and getting put out 
of business. 
There are of course, instances where auctions do not go well 
and negative feedback is merited. This may happen for a variety of 
reasons, but it is often due to slow shipping or the item arriving 
differently than described. There are other instances where negative 
feedback appears to be left only to punish people. In a relatively recent 
article on punishment, Price et al. (2002) propose the almost 
tautological notion that punishment evolved as a mechanism to quell 
freeriding. They demonstrate empirically that punishment is employed 
not to increase the punisher's wellbeing but to decrease the freerider's 
(Price 2002: 179). In other words, people often punish others at their 
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own expense. The punishers identified by Price et al. could be defmed 
as strong reciprocators. Strong reciprocators are individuals who are 
acutely aware and defensive of local social norms (Gintis, 2000). 
When a freerider attempts to violate local norms, strong reciprocators 
put an end to their behavior regardless of the costs they incur 
themselves (Gintis 2000). If, as I have hypothesized, leaving negative 
feedback ensures negative feedback will be reciprocated, it may be the 
case that the e8ay community is populated by a high proportion of 
strong reciprocators, or that the e8ay community fosters "strong" 
behavior among its members. 
Hypothesis and Methods 
The alternative hypothesis being tested here proposes that in a 
real-world setting (e8ay), people will act in a way that is concurrent 
with the predictions of strong reciprocity described above. That is, 
people will punish others even if there is no direct benefit to doing so. 
A total of 60 e8ay auctions were selected at for consideration 
in this study. Randomization was insured by the following selection 
process. First, a random word was selected from a dictionary (e.g., 
"dog"), the word "dog" was then typed into the search field located on 
e8ay's homepage (www.ebay.com). The search then returned a list of 
auctions containing the word "dog" in their title. From this list, the last 
auction on the page was selected. This brought up a live, ongoing 
auction for the dog-related item. The most recent negative transaction 
of the person selling this item was chosen for analysis. Information 
concerning several areas was collected for each of these negative 
transactions: a) the feedback score left by the buyer and seller, b) the 
positions in which scores were left, and c) the self-reported reasons 
given by each participant for leaving such a score, and d) the 
cumulative scores of both individuals. SPSS was used to test the 
alternate hypothesis and to discern the primary motivations cited for 
leaving negative feedback. 
Results 
The results of a 2 x 2 chi-square test show the significant and 
dramatic effects of relative position on feedback (refer to Graph I). 
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In auctions involving negative feedback, when participants left positive 
feedback first, negative feedback was returned to them 57% of the time. 
When participants left negative feedback first, negative feedback was 
returned 100% of the time. This difference is statistically significant 
(p=.OOl, X2=11.679, df=l, n=24). In these cases, participants made no 
bones about why they chose to respond negatively to those who left 
them a negative score - in 46.2% of negative feedback cases, "left 
negative feedback for me" was cited as the reason for doing so. 
Discussion 
For eBay participants, leaving negative feedback for someone 
in the first position guarantees the reception of negative feedback in 
retaliation. This is less than optimal for the eBay community. In a 
truly "honest" system, it would not matter what buyers and sellers say 
about one another. It is perfectly feasible that a seller could be happy 
about a transaction because he received payment quickly. He should 
therefore give the buyer positive feedback for prompt payment. If, say, 
the item then takes an unsatisfactorily long time to arrive at the buyer's 
home because of an error or laziness on the part of the seller, the buyer 
should leave negative feedback so that others do not suffer the same 
inconvenience. In reality, this sort of mixed feedback transaction is 
rare because strong reciprocators are enforcing norms that run counter 
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to eBay's wishes. This may be because the reputation garnered on 
eBay is not likely to affect the way someone is treated outside of the 
eBay community. The relatively socially isolated world of eBay buyers 
and sellers encourages each side to try to strong arm the other into 
leaving positive feedback regardless of the circumstances. 
It is unlikely that there is a way to extend a person's eBay 
reputation in to the world outside of the internet or to simply persuade 
the entire eBay community to be more liberal in their use of negative 
and neutral feedback (who in their right mind would want to go first?). 
A better way to encourage a more honest system may be to give blind 
feedback. Blind feedback would take away the ability of one person to 
punish another because of actions made outside the realm of the 
transaction itself. Additionally, it would provide a more honest 
representation of eBay members' trustworthiness. 
Conclusion 
The hypothesis that negative feedback is reciprocated with 
negative feedback regardless of what actually transpires during an eBay 
auction was supported. The feedback system employed by eBay does 
not serve the best interests of eBay members because it is not the most 
honest system possible. A more honest system would incorporate blind 
feedback in order to sidestep the inclination of some to punish on 
principle alone. 
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